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the means of production. We show that the introduction of moral hazard on the part of hired labour increases the explanatory power of Roemer's scheme.
The framework is used to understand the formation of agrarian class structure. It is also used to provide an explanation of the inverse relationship between farm size and the labour input per acre. In its general equilibrium form, the framework allows us to carry out comparative static exercises that help us to analyse in a formal way the consequences of institutional policy actions. We have examined the effects of land and credit reform on social welfare, income distribution, the number of people in poverty, the proletarianisation of marginal cultivators and the welfare of the landless class.
I. THE PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we assume that the factor prices are exogenously given and then consider the optimisation problem facing an agent who is constrained by the credit available to him and by his time endowment. The optimal time allocation made by each agent determines the mode of cultivation he will adopt. We assume that the production process entails the use of two inputs land (h) and labour (n), both of which are essential. The production function,f(h, n), is assumed to be linearly homogeneous, increasing, strictly quasi-concave and twice-continuously differentiable in its arguments. We can write the output, q, of a farm as q = cf(h, n),
where e is a positive random variable with expected value unity, embodying the effect of such stochastic factors as the weather. Land and labour can be hired in competitive markets at (exogenously given) prices v and w, respectively. The price, P, of output is also exogenously given -determined, say, in the world market. We assume that production entails the incurrence of fixed set-up costs, K. While we are abstracting from all inputs other than land and labour, we introduce K as a proxy to represent the fixed component of the costs associated with other inputs. An example might be the fixed costs associated with the sinking of tube-wells for irrigation. K is a set-up cost associated with each farm. While the production function itself is linearly homogenous, these costs, required to initiate production, will render unprofitable the cultivation of extremely small plot sizes. We shall see later on that these costs are also partly responsible for the existence of a class of pure agricultural workers in the economy. The amount of working capital, B, to which a farmer has access, is typically determined by the assets he possesses -mainly the amount of land, X, he owns.' Note that since land can be leased in or leased out, h can be greater than or less than h. Thus the scale of operation of a farmer is bounded by the working capital constraint.
vh+w(n-l) < B-K+vl+wt
(2) 1 In most agrarian economies the total wealth of an agent is strongly correlated with land-ownership. The use of other assests besides land for collateral would not change our results qualitatively. Note that we take the distribution of land-ownership as exogenously given. Binswanger and Rosenzweig (I982) offer a compelling explanation for the relative infrequency of land sales in the less-developed countries.
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[JUNE where n is the total amount of labour applied, I the amount of labour he himself supplies, h is the amount of land he cultivates, and t the amount of time he sells on the labour market. The use of owned land and own labour in cultivation are valued at the going prices. In writing down (2) we have implicitly assumed that all capital outlays are incurred at the beginning of the production period.' The interest rate per crop season (which does not play a substantive role in our model), is assumed to be exogenously fixed at some level r > o. It is well recognised that the potential for moral hazard on the part of hired workers makes their supervision imperative. Implicit in (i) is the assumption that n is the number of efficiency units of labour applied. The presence of the stochastic variable e in (i) renders it impossible to infer from the knowledge of any two of q, h and n, the value of the third. Thus even a supervisor will have the incentive to shirk and will need to be monitored -unless be is a residual claimant (Alchian and Demsetz, I972). It follows that the entrepreneur must himself undertake the task of supervision -the only substantive implication of uncertainty in our model, since we shall be abstracting from risk preferences.
We assume that each agent is endowed with one unit of time. Let R denote the amount of leisure ('rest') he consumes (to be endogenised below). The agent can then allocate the remaining amount of time (i -R) across three activities:
(a) selling his services (for an amount of time t) in the labour market, (b) working on his own farm (for an amount of time 1), (c) supervising hired labour on his farm (for an amount of time S, say).
We assume that the amount of time required of the entrepreneur to supervise L hired workers is an increasing and strictly convex function of L:
with s(o) = o and, to ensure that the supervision of hired labour is not prohibitively costly for all L, s'(o) < i. Strict convexity of the supervision function is rationalised on the traditional grounds that it renders finite the size of the enterprise despite linear homogeneity of the production function. We discuss later the consequences of relaxing the assumption of strict convexity of s(L).
The time endowment constraint facing an entrepreneur may now be written.
The left-hand side of (4) is the amount of time, 1, the entrepreneur works on own farm as a labourer.
To complete the specification of the model we posit that all agents have identical preferences defined over the present value earnings, Y, of the period and leisure. For tractability, the utility function is posited to have the additive structure:
with u' > o, u" < o. Further, we shall take it that the marginal utility of leisure is infinite at R = o. Note that the linearity of the utility function in income implies that the agent is risk-neutral.
We now turn to the optimisation problem facing an agent. For the moment we shall examine the agent's choices assuming that he opts to cultivate. We shall subsequently analyse his choice between being a cultivator and an agricultural worker. First, note that according to (3) the supervision time required of the entrepreneur depends only on the aggregate amount of labour be hires. Thus the time spent on supervision cannot be lowered by operating two separate plots of land rather than one. The existence of positive set-up costs associated with each operation then renders it suboptimal for an agent to operate two or more separate farming establishments.' We first consider the problem confronting an agent who has sufficient capital to cultivate. (Later, we will address the question as to whether he will, in fact, opt to do so.) An entrepreneur seeking to maximise his expected utility by cultivation will thus solve max P3ff(h, I+L) +Wt-v(h-h;)-wL-K+u(R), An agent with severely restricted access to capital can lease in only a small amount of land; the marginal revenue product of his labour on this piece of land would be correspondingly small. He thus finds it optimal to sell his services on the labour market for part of the time, thereby augmenting his working capital. He then earns a return on this capital by expanding his operation. Such agents are the labourer-cultivators, who are wage-earners cum entrepreneurs. The amount of leisure they consume is determined by the condition that the utility derived from the marginal unit of leisure equals the income from cultivation that is foregone as a result. Since the latter is constant for a linearly homogeneous production function, it follows that all labourer-cultivators consume the same amount of leisure.
The greater the working capital a labourer-cultivator has access to, the greater the amount of land he can rent and, therefore, the larger is the marginal product of his own labour. Since all labourer-cultivators consume the same amount of leisure, it follows that those with larger budgets will sell less of their labour services and devote more time to cultivation. The agent with a budget B = B1 altogether ceases to transact in the labour market: he devotes all of his non-leisure time to cultivation. If hired and own labour had the same price, an agent with a budget marginally greater than B1 would hire outside help. This, however, is not so. While the wage rate earned by the agent in the labour market would be w, the cost to him of hiring the first worker on his own farm is w + s' (o) u'(R), which is strictly greater than w since s'(o) > o. Thus this agent will not hire outside help; he will expend his entire budget on hiring land and opt to be a self-cultivator. Agents with greater access to working capital will (self-)cultivate larger farms by consuming less leisure.
Since each agent has a limited amount of time endowment, the price of ownlabour (i.e. the marginal utility of leisure foregone) becomes increasingly higher at higher levels of working capital. The ratio-of the effective price of hired to own labour, i.e.[(w +s'(o) u'(R)]/u'(R), declines. An agent with some sufficiently high budget B2(> B1) will thus find it optimal to hire and supervise outside help, apart from applying some of his own labour on the farm. This agent marks the transition from the class of self-cultivators to the class of small capitalists. We thus see that the capitalist mode of cultivation emerges as a natural response to the need of entrepreneurs to circumvent their time-endowment constraints. Agents with budgets greater then B2 will hire greater amounts of labour and spend more time in supervision. At some level of working capital B3(> B2) it pays the agent to specialise in supervision, all labour is hired labour and the agent maximises the returns to his access to working capital by only supervising hired hands. Agents with B > B3 comprise the class of large capitalists.
In proposition I we have merely derived all the modes of cultivation that are potentially observable. We have presumed that the agent in question in fact opts to cultivate. Whether or not he will do so will depend on whether or not his maximised utility U*(B, v, w, K), in cultivation exceeds his maximised utility in the next best alternative: being a pure agricultural worker. As an If set-up costs, K, were zero, all agents (including those with B = o) will opt to cultivate if the technology is at all viable at prices (P, v, w). However, if set-up costs are positive and sufficiently large, agents with meagre working capital would find it more attractive to join the labour force on a full-time basis than to cultivate on a scale so small as to be unprofitable. Those agents for whom (I o) is violated will form the class of pure agricultural workers. There thus emerges a fivefold class structure in our model of an agrarian economy.' In reality, cultivation may not be feasible for the poorest agents because they have to assure themselves of a minimum subsistence before they can expend resources to engage in cultivation. Thus a pure labourer class could obtain even in the absence of scale economies. However, for expediency in modelling we shall continue with our assumption of positive set-up costs in cultivation.
For the rest of this section we shall assume that all the modes of cultivation we have discussed are manifest. In other words, if Bmax denotes the 'largest amount of capital that a single entrepreneur can profitably utilise in agriculture, then Bmax > B3. The quantity Bmax is determined as the smallest value of B for which the capital constraint ceases to bind in (6), and will depend on P, v and w in general.
We now turn our attention to the land-to-labour ratio of farms as a function of the entrepreneurs' access to working capital. The following proposition records our results comparing the land-to-labour ratio and the average productivity per acre across farms spanning the four modes of cultivation. PROPOSITION 2. As a function of B, (a) the land-to-labour ratio is constant over the labourer-cultivator class and strictly increasing over all other classes, (b) the (expected) output per acre of farms is constant over the labour cultivator class and strictly decreasing over all other classes.
1 In a tour de force in Marxian economics, Roemer (1982) was the first to derive analytically a a fivefold class structure in an economy in which agents have differential access to the means of production. There is one essential difference between Roemer's analysis of class structure and ours. If only a single crop is produced, the class in Roemer's framework which is the analogue of what we call selfcultivators in our formulation is a set of measure zero. This arises from his implicit assumption that own and (unsupervised) hired labour are perfect substitutes. We have seen above that if agents are arranged in the order of increasing budgets, the agent with a budget B1 will be the first one to self-cultivate. Further, if s' (o) = o he would also be the only one to self-cultivate since all agents with budgets exceeding B1 will find it optimal to hire outside help. If the distribution of the access to capital across the agents of the economy is continuous, it follows that self-cultivators would form a set of zero measure. In our formulation, this anomaly does not arise. As long as hired labour requires supervision, there exists an interval [B1, B2] of strictly positive length such that all agents with budgets in this range would choose to self-cultivate. Bardhan (1982) presents an enlightening empirical analysis of agrarian class structure in West Bengal, India, based on Roemer's theoretical framework.
[JUNE Intuition for the above proposition can be readily had. By equating the marginal utility per dollar spent on the two factors, the agents are, in effect, setting the ratio of the marginal products of land and labour equal to the ratio of their perceived prices. The perceived price of land is the same for all agents, and equals its market price. We have seen that all labourer-cultivators consume the same amount of leisure, so that the perceived price of (own) labour is constant for all B < B1. Since the price ratio of the factors (land and own labour) is constant for B < B1, production from a linearly homogeneous technology will use the factors in a fixed ratio. We have also seen that, beyond B1, increases in B induce the entrepreneurs to consume less leisure, resulting in a rising perceived price of own labour. Since the price of land is constant, we shall observe a bias towards land in the use of factors under self-cultivation: the land-to-labour ratio will increase with B. In the capitalistic mode of production, this effect is further reinforced by the fact that the cost of supervising hired labour increases at an increasing rate with the amount of labour hired. Part (b) of the above proposition follows directly from part (a) and the linear homogeneity of the production function. To the extent that our thinking is conditioned by the implicit assumption that markets are perfect, these results would appear counter-intuitive. If agents were not constrained in their borrowing, for example, it would be Pareto-efficient for those agents currently operating inefficiently large farms to lease out some of their land to agents with smaller (and hence more efficient) farms. In equilibrium, we would then expect all agents to operate farms of identical sizes.
We now briefly discuss how the results of these propositions would be affected by relaxing our assumptions regarding the nature of the supervision function s(L) and the set-up costs K. Our results are driven by the assumption of increasing marginal disutility of effort. Even if the supervision function s(L) were not strictly convex in L but the cost of supervision in terms of the entrepreneur's utility were so, these results would still obtain. Thus if, as might be argued for share tenancy, the supervision function is linear, the results of Propositions I and 2 would be quite unaffected except for one minor qualification: the landto-labour ratio is constant for the small capitalist class. On the other hand, if the supervision function is strictly concave, the labour costs in terms of the entrepreneur's utility may not be convex. The results of Proposition 2 may then not obtain.
It is conceivable that the set-up costs (e.g. irrigation) increase with the size of the plot cultivated. This would be equivalent to altering the effective price of land with the plot-size. If the set-up costs increase less than proportionately with the plot-size then the effective price of land is declining with the plot-size, and the results of Proposition 2 are further strengthened. If the set-up costs rise proportionately with the plot-size then again our results are intact, since the effective price of land is constant. Finally, if the set-up costs rise more than proportionately with the plot-size, the results are ambiguous because the effective prices of both land and labour are rising with the scale of operation.
Among the hypotheses alternative to the one proposed in this paper for the inverse relationship between size and labour usage per acre, the most celebrated , I978 ) the size-productivity relationship for foodgrains such as rice and wheat certainly seems to have changed from being inverse to being direct over the past thirty years. It is our contention that the greater use of physical capital over time is responsible for this change in Mexico and Punjab (India). Labour-displacing capital not only mitigates the scale diseconomies introduced by the heavy supervision requirement of large farms, but it also introduces scale economies due to indivisibilities. Since only large farms can utilise such capital, it is not surprising that the more recent data reveal a positive size-productivity relationship.
II. THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we set up a general equilibrium version of the model we considered in the previous section. Agents are allowed to choose the activities they undertake, their choices being dictated by the going prices and their access to working capital. The present value of the output price, P/3, is normalised to unity. The factor prices are determined as those which clear the labour and land-rental markets, given the decisions of the agents in the economy. The general equilibrium framework, in which factor prices and class structure are endogenously thrown up, enables us to evaluate the income-distribution and welfare effects of policy actions such as land reform and credit reform. Since We are now ready to address the choice facing a typical agent: Given his owned land holding (and, therefore, the credit he has access to), the set-up costs, K, and parametric prices v and w, should he lease out his land and join the labour force, or should he cultivate? In case he opts for the latter, there is no presumption that his operational holding will equal his owned holding. Consider agent p of the landed class. If he cultivates, he will solve the optimisation problem (6), with f(h, n) given by ( Note that since all of the landless agents are identical in every respect, their choices will also be identical.
We are now ready to write down the conditions that characterise the general equilibrium of this agrarian economy. Given the optimising choices ofindividual agents elaborated on above, these conditions are essentially the market clearing conditions for land and labour: Noh*(0-K, v, w) + NJ h*{B[I(p)], v, w} dp-H = o? 
where Bmax. as defined in the previous section, is the largest amount of capital that can be profitably utilised in agriculture. In writing down (20c) we have followed the convention that if one of the inequalities is strict the other must hold with equality. Condition (2od) says that cultivation is the less attractive option for all agents in the economy, i.e. cultivation is not viable at these prices. The simultaneous solution to conditions ( 1 Notice that in Fig. 3 , Gi exceeds Gh. In the absence of set-up costs, the opposite would be true since the profits per acre would be declining in the farm size (Rao, I977, p. 148). For significant set-up costs, however, this would not remain so.
2 Note that land reform, by equalising access to credit across agents, increases the number of cultivators. This would increase the aggregate set-up cost incurred by the economy. If the set-up cost K is inordinately large, it is conceivable that social welfare could in fact decline following a land reform. This, however, is unlikely. Moreover, if the class of pure labourers arises due to minimal consumption requirements (as pointed out in the text) rather than due to set-up costs in cultivation, social welfare will unambiguously increase following land reform. welfare of landless workers. The relationship becomes concave as the distribution gets more uniform. Clearly, the benefits of land reform for the landless are quite marked when the ownership distribution among the landed is highly skewed. Fig. 5 illustrates the results of a credit reform in which the total volume of the credit is held constant, while 0 (the parameter which determines the extent to which the access to credit is dependent on land ownership) is varied. When 0 = o, the access to credit is completely independent of land ownership; when 0 is large, the access to credit is, of course, extremely sensitive to land ownership. In order to ensure that the aggregate credit, BT, due to the change in aggregate output, we may interpret the welfare function in Fig. 5 as an approximation of GNP.) This provides the theoretical rationale for the argument that the creation of institutions capable of accepting as collateral future crops rather than owned land-holdings would prove to be an effective tool for removing poverty as well as for improving efficiency.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The cornerstones of the model presented in this paper are the two constraints facing each agent in his optimisation problem: (i) the amount of working capital (or credit) available to him and (2) his limited time endowment. The constraint on the availability of working capital arises from the characteristics of capital markets in which credit is rationed according to the ability to offer collateral. The fact that the total time available to an agent is fixed matters because the (unsupervised) time purchased from another agent on the market is an imperfect substitute for one's own time. The allocative process is thus influenced by imperfections in two key markets -imperfections in the sense that agents cannot purchase desired amounts of working capital or effective labour at given prices.
In an economy in which agents are bound by the above two constraints, we have demonstrated that in equilibrium there is a misallocation of resources: land-to-labour ratios differ across farm sizes and there is scope for welfare-and output-improving transfers of resources across agents. It is important to note that this misallocation arises because of imperfections in two markets. If agents could borrow unlimited amounts of capital at a given interest rate, all farms
